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Programmers’ lack of knowledge and interest in secure develop-
ment threatens everyone who uses mobile apps. The rise of apps 
has engaged millions of independent app developers, who rarely 
encounter any but low level security techniques. But what if 
software security were presented as a game, or a story, or a 
discussion? What if learning app security techniques could be fun 
as well as empowering?  Only by introducing the powerful 
motivating techniques developed for other disciplines can we 
hope to upskill independent app developers, and achieve the 
security that we’ll need in 2025 to safeguard our identities and our 
data. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Mobile apps are increasingly becoming the lynch pins of our 
lives. We use apps to communicate, apps to plan, apps to manage 
our finances, apps to do our shopping, and apps to remember all 
our security information.  
Creating our apps are more than 2.9 million app developers, of 
whom only some 25% are professionals developing apps for 
companies [12]. In those apps, cloud-based connectivity and 
social networking functionality are making trust and security 
issues fundamentally important. So security expertise – and hence 
effective security practices – in those developing such apps is 
vital. 
Yet there is considerable evidence that such expertise is lacking. 
Analysis of the top five payment apps by Bluebox, a security 
solution provider, found significant security failures in each [3]; 
analysis of a range of Android apps by Enck et al found privacy 
problems in most of them [6]. Both analyses highlighted that it 
was the choices that the app programmers had made that were 
causing the problems; given the same environment and cloud 
services they could have chosen problem-free implementations. 
And indeed a recent IBM-driven survey of opinions about app 
security in American companies [9] revealed that more than 70% 
percent believed that the developer inexperience was a major 
threat to their business. 
2. EXPLORING THE PROBLEM 
To address this problem, the authors instigated open-ended 
interviews with a dozen experts in app security. Table 1 lists the 
participants along with the organization each worked with most; it 
shows an indication of the organization size and a subjective 
estimate of the organization’s position in on a ‘secure software 
capability maturity model’. Throughout this paper we’ve quoted 
from interviewees, giving their identifiers. 
Table 1: Interviewees and their organizations 
Identi-
fier 




P1, P12 Bespoke app developer Solo Low 
P2, P7 Mobile phone manufacturer Med. High 
P3, P11 Operating system supplier Large High 




P6 Promoting industry Gov’t Low 
P8 Telecoms service provider Large Med. 
P9 Bank Large Med. 




The conclusions were daunting. Most of the interviewees, natural-
ly, were working in areas where there was considerable effort put 
into security. But they saw little interest or activity related to app 
security in other companies and areas.  
“Very very few developers are actually interested in security… 
You can see that from the Apps World [exhibition] where there’s 
no mention of security at all.” (P1)  
And where app programmers are learning about security, the 
experts saw them as typically concentrating on low-level, check-
list based, approaches to getting app code secure, and ignoring the 
wider picture. Our interviewees were clear that in order to get 
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effective app privacy and security, programmers would need to 
have some awareness of the wider issues of security.  
“Businesses need to take a realistic approach – it's a business 
decision on their part – 'I understand what my assets are and I 
understand what things I need to protect and I understand how 
much I am willing to pay for that – and understand how much risk 
I am going to take.'  None of these things do you need to know 
what a buffer overflow is for!   
But nevertheless that is what lots of people, including PCI as it 
happens, seem to think computer security is about – and it really 
shouldn't be.” (P6) 
2.1 Difficulty of Learning Security 
Developers in the large, security-aware, companies are already 
well catered for with on-the-job training in app security.  
“The internal training, and tools and technologies for [software 
privacy] are good. Mostly through internal training, I guess, 
nowadays.” (P3) 
Our experts indicated, however, that app developers in other 
contexts are not generally learning what they need to know. They 
have no colleagues to learn from; training is expensive and not 
felt necessary.  
“I’m probably not unusual in terms of software people in that you 
don’t really take courses”. (P12). 
Most security writing has a further problem, highlighted by 
Conradi and Dyba [4]: programmers resist learning from the 
output of process improvers, and particularly from formal written 
routines. Yet much of the existing security literature is of this 
kind. 
Furthermore many undergraduate university courses do not cover 
app security well, so even those trained there are not being well 
catered for. 
“So for the majority of people who are currently going through 
various computer science degrees, security doesn't really come 
into it at all, in any real context”. (P10) 
2.2 Relationship to Other Learning 
Let’s consider the typical approaches that app programmers do 
have for learning. As Enes [7] found, most professional learning is 
on-the-job. Our interviewees confirmed this. 
 “We use external consultancies but we haven't really done any 
formalized training” (P2) 
So the main sources of information are those normally available to 
app programmers. These are: 
 Web searches, typically leading to developer sites such 
as Stack Overflow. 
 Popular guides such as the O’Reilly series 
 Occasional shows and industry events 
 Blogs on app development 
 Operating system websites  
Guide books for app programmers do exist, such as Application 
Security for the Android Platform [10] or Learning iOS Security 
[1]; however since few app programmers are interested in securi-
ty, they’re not well motivated to buy them – and both books are 
restricted to exploring the security features of their respective 
platforms. Similarly operating system manufacturers’ websites 
and blogs on app development aren’t helpful unless programmers 
actively seek them out. 
Unfortunately, as a learning resource, Stack Overflow and similar 
bulletin boards have a significant flaw: they are poor for gaining 
an overview to a topic, and actively discourage questions that 
don’t have focused answers. A detailed analysis of the topics on 
the Stack Overflow site [2] found little in the way of overview 
discussions.  
Thus sites like Stack Overflow are valuable in helping program-
mers sort out problems they know they have, but don’t help 
programmers with problems they don’t know they may have; 
most security problems are likely to be of this second type. 
3. WHAT DO PROGRAMMERS NEED TO 
LEARN? 
From the interviews we have identified a set of key security 
techniques that app developers need to know. These fall naturally 
under five categories: analysis, communication, dialectic, feed-
back and upgrading. The following sections explore each in turn. 
3.1 Analysis 
Security analysis is thinking outside the simple scope of pro-
gramming. In particular it is the need to make security-aware 
choices of programming environment, tools and components. It is 
the need to review the system from the point of view of an 
attacker, and to identify likely exploits. It is understanding and 
thinking through the motivations of possible attackers, in order to 
understand how best and most cheaply to deter them. 
“I think the things that are the most challenging around security 
really are trying to understand the threat landscape and trying to 
understand how threats are realized.” (P2) 
3.2 Communication 
The primary communication the experts identified is the discus-
sion with project stakeholders about security. Our experts were 
clear that there is no such thing as perfect security, and that the 
trade-offs between the various costs of security (such as develop-
ment time, usability issues, tool costs and expertise costs) require 
discussion with stakeholders. There are particular skills in repre-
senting security decisions in terms that non-programmers will 
understand.  
“It goes from there: how secure do you want it to be. You have to 
show that there’s a problem first I think, that’s how it’s phrased”. 
(P1)  
A second place where communication is important in the context 
of security is the discussion with other teams about responsibili-
ties and the impact of different exploits. 
“[In a project with successful security] everybody who was close 
to the project, lived through the project life cycle to delivery, was 
very comfortable picking the phone up to anybody else and 
discussing any aspect, and everyone reported back quite openly 
what they were seeing, and when we came together”. (P8) 
3.3 Dialectic 
Dialectic is a word from Greek that means learning by interrogat-
ing. Many of the best and most often mentioned security 
techniques are dialectic and involve critiquing what the program-
mer has produced: penetration testing, code reviews, code analysis 
tools, and even automated testing tools. Obviously the choice of 
approach depends on the programmer’s situation; penetration 
testing can be expensive. But free code analysis tools ensure that 
every app programmer has access to at least one of these. 
“We do code reviews as much as possible”. (P7).  
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“[Security] tends to get handed off, in most companies I've 
worked with, to a white-hat hacking team.” (P8). 
“And so [when] the tools do the code inspection review for you, 
for free, constantly, all the time, so you can't skip it, then yes, 
that’s a huge win”.(P3) 
3.4 Feedback 
Many interviewees stressed the importance of gathering infor-
mation from the deployed apps to detect and evaluate security 
issues. This is much more difficult with mobile apps than servers, 
since apps don’t have continuous connections and are on devices 
under the control of other people. But there are a range of tools 
available, and so programmers need to be aware of the possible 
need for feedback mechanisms. 
“I think one of the problems with remote devices is that these 
devices are intended to be robust against all attackers if you lose 
your device. So the builds that we produce – we're trying to look 
at them and see what is happening on them, [but they are built] by 
design such that [you] can't get raw access to those devices” 
(P11) 
3.5 Upgrading 
Many apps are released with a “fire and forget” mentality. This 
does not work well with security issues, where the security 
landscape is changing continuously and the nature of threats 
changes too. So app developers need to consider mechanisms to 
ensure upgrading. There are practical issues: though the ‘App 
Stores’ support upgrading, this feature is often not actioned by 
users. And there are commercial issues: once a project has ended 
who will implement upgrades? So app developers need to consid-
er ways to support and enforce upgrading. 
“And the patches and updates are basically what modern security 
is about – mistakes will be made and when the mistakes are found 
– how do you get the updates out?” (P3) 
4. REACHING THE MASSES 
Thus there is a vast population of isolated developers who are not 
being reached by the existing resources and information about app 
security: both developers on their own, and those developing apps 
within organizations that don’t currently see security as an issue.  
We’ve identified five key points we need to teach to these isolated 
app developers: analysis, communication, dialectic, feedback and 
upgrading – each in the context of app development security. 
And we’ve uncovered three important roadblocks hindering the 
learning of app security: first, programmers don’t learn well from 
process-improvement styles of literature; second, the main 
programmer sources of knowledge (‘Googling Stack Exchange’) 
won’t give programmers the information they most need to know; 
and finally, most app developers don’t appreciate that they may 
need to learn about the subject.  
To improve the situation we need to reach out to a group of 
individuals, without having direct access to them. It’s a different 
problem from teaching other aspects of software development, 
such as internationalization or DevOps, since app developers 
won’t necessarily access good resources or training even if these 
are available. We need a new paradigm; we need a new way to 
reach these people. 
4.1 A Different Approach 
Different programmers learn in different ways and are interested 
in different things, so we believe a single form of intervention, 
however effective, is unlikely to reach all of our target audience. 
Also, since we are in effect teaching new attitudes, few of the 
traditional mechanisms such as books are likely to work.  
We propose instead ‘engaging’ interventions likely to appeal to 
programmers for their own sake. We anticipate that these will be 
publicized via the web: expert blogs, and security OS websites. 
The following sections explore some possibilities for these 
interventions. 
4.2 Games that Teach 
One popular approach is games. A great deal of work has been 
done on gamification, with books such as Kapp’s [8] explaining 
the techniques involved. Tillman et al’s game Code Hunt [11] 
teaches vast numbers of programmers through an online game. 
Code Hunt’s approach is to provide a unit test that the program-
mer’s code must pass; this certainly demonstrates the dialectic 
aspect, but will not be very good for teaching the other security 
techniques. Other researchers, including the authors, have had 
success with group games to teach aspects of software security, 
such as Denning et al’s Control-Alt-Hack game [5]. These work 
very well in a classroom or conference context, but do not natural-
ly extend to reach to an online audience. 
Picture Angry Birds meeting Stack Overflow! Create an online 
game where players implement security aspects to defend against 
attacks? Perhaps crowd source both attacks and defenses, where 
each player gets to both take the role of attacker on other players’ 
code, and defender on their own? It’s an enchanting possibility; 
even if it risks taking too much time to engage the typical target 
solo programmer. 
4.3 Story Telling 
A different approach is story-telling. The British radio soap opera, 
The Archers, has been running for 65 years, and has over 5 
million regular listeners; its main purpose, at which it is highly 
successful, is to teach farming knowledge to a community that is 
unreachable by any other form of education. Taking a similar 
approach here would suggest a podcast (and blog) narrating a plot 
that would cover and teach each of these aspects.  
More ambitious would be a storyline in an appropriate existing 
series (‘Mr. Robot’, and the UK’s ‘IT Crowd’ come to mind), to 
be created if the opportunity arose. 
4.4 Adapting Business as Usual Approaches 
More conventional is to tailor direct teaching and group learning 
approaches to the distributed nature of the target audience. This 
suggests implementing a massively open online course (MOOC) 
on app security using audio, written text, and video along with 
interactive discussion groups. Organizations such as edX and 
Futurelearn provide frameworks to make this straightforward. 
Another possibility is a short video along the lines of – or indeed 
actually – a TED talk by a suitable expert;  
Both possibilities leverage the ‘professional skills gaining’ 
motivation present in programmers, which suggests promoting 
them via professional organizations too. 
5. RESEARCH AGENDA 
Whilst each of these interventions has promise, we don’t know 
which are likely to be effective, nor which techniques and variants 
of each will have the most impact. This leads us to a set of 
research questions, as follows.  
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RQ1 How best to design and implement the interventions to 
convey the security techniques discussed in Section 3? 
This is a complex problem, involving amongst other aspects 
elements of design, gamification, and measurement of im-
pact. 
RQ2 Which interventions – and dissemination techniques – 
are most effective at conveying each technique to the 
largest population of programmers? Implementing all the 
interventions at scale will be costly; we’ll need to evaluate 
which ones offer the most value. 
RQ3 Which interventions provoke a wider interest in the 
programmers reached? To achieve a lasting effect we do 
not just need to engage programmers initially, but need also 
to encourage further interest in the subject so they learn also 
from existing sources of security education. 
This approach is very different from others in the field of pro-
grammer education, making this an entirely new subdiscipline. 
The research will require a multi-disciplinary team, with varied 
skills including at least the following: 
Programming: To implement code based interventions such as 
games. 
Psychology: To achieve the ‘attractiveness’ of the content; to 
structure measurement of the results; to use psy-
chological techniques to ‘nudge’ programmers 
towards more effective security practices. 
Creative writing: For the storyline. 
Narration: For an engaging verbal version of the storyline. 
Marketing: To establish and develop the channels to bring 
the content to the target audience. 
6. EVALUATING TECHNIQUES 
The research will require objective measurement. In particular we 
can identify four aspects to measure: 
Success using the interventions with a sample group of 
students or similar, and evaluating their learning 
based on the intervention (RQ1). 
Reach the number of downloads, accesses, or to the 
resource (RQ2) 
Engagement the number of accesses of later parts of the 
resource. (RQ2) 
Coverage attending exhibitions such as Apps World 
frequented by the target solo programmer 
audience and asking via a simple questionnaire 
of delegates which if any of the interventions 
they have encountered and their impact (RQ2 
RQ3). 
Ideally we’ll want to extend our research to measure outcomes as 
well as these outputs. Whilst we can argue that the combination of 
‘success’ with ‘engagement’ and ‘coverage’ implies a positive 
impact, better still would be evidence of an improvement in the 
code produced by programmers in the target group.  
To achieve that, we might collect app identifiers, where possible, 
from participants for a ‘before and after’ anonymous evaluation of 
their released apps’ security along the lines of that by Enck et al. 
[6]. Other possibilities would include extending the questionnaires 
in the ‘coverage’ evaluation to estimate interviewees’ awareness 
of app security or access to other learning resources, and correlat-
ing that with exposure to the interventions. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we explored the need to improve the security skills 
of isolated app developers. We explored the resources currently 
available and concluded that they were insufficient for the job of 
both learning and motivation. 
To address these issues we propose a research agenda for a new 
subdiscipline: research into ways to motivate and teach app 
security for the isolated developer. We propose a set of research 
questions, a multi-disciplinary team, several ways to reach the 
developers in question, three approaches to teaching, and four 
aspects we can measure to evaluate the success of each approach. 
It’s important that our future app security is not left to chance; we 
believe this new subdiscipline will make a substantial contribu-
tion. 
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